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Abstract: We consider a multinational global firm that adopts corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
in two countries and examine international privatization policies with the strategic transmission of 
CSR. We find that the strategic level of CSR crucially depends on the percentage of the global firm’s 
shares held in each country. We show that single privatization increases (decreases) CSR when the 
share is small (large), while dual privatization always leads to the highest CSR. We also show that 
domestic welfare under global standard of CSR, which is set to improve global welfare, is higher 
(lower) than that under the global firm’s strategic CSR when the share is small (large). Finally, we 
show that dual nationalization is a unique equilibrium in an international privatization choice game, 
irrespective of imposing the global standard of CSR, which causes global welfare loss. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
In modern economies, most international trade is dominated by a few multinational global firms, 
which participate heavily in the international multiple activities and account for substantial shares of 
aggregate trade. 1 Accordingly, research in international trade has changed dramatically over the last 
twenty years, as attention has shifted from countries and industries toward firms. Many studies have 
shown that exporting outputs or importing inputs through international transactions can potentially 
enhance the productive capacity of domestic firms through productivity gains, R&D, and innovation.2 
The main mechanism proposed in the literature to explain the relation between productivity and 
engagement with global markets is that technology can be transmitted through the global production. 
In recent years, the interest in corporate social responsibility (CSR) from a social demand 
perspective has grown rapidly in response to globalization, limitations in government regulations, and 
an increasing societal and media demand for ethical and environmentally responsible business 
operations. 3  CSR has now become a global business strategy and provides significant welfare 
implications for designing optimal policies.4 Subsequently, recent research on oligopoly markets with 
heterogeneous objective functions have analyzed different forms of market competition in which 
profit-maximizing firms may compete with other global firms that adopt CSR activities.  
Among the various motives for CSR, its strategic use in markets with imperfect competition 
plays an important role. In particular, many theoretical papers utilized an oligopoly model in which 
the firm adopts consumer surplus as a proxy of its own CSR concerns in the market transactions.5  
                                                          
1 Using US firm and trade transactions data, for example, Bernard et al. (2018) reviewed the shares of aggregate 
trade in international economics and provided strong evidence in support of interdependencies and 
complementarities between the margins of global firms from their international participation. 
2 For example, see Blalock and Gertler (2008), Lileeva and Trefler (2010), Puga and Trefler (2010), and Aw et 
al. (2011) among others. 
3  Some practical examples include GE’s Ecomagination program, Nestle’s Creating Shared Values, and 
Unilever’s Simple Living Plan. For comprehensive discussions on recent CSR research, see Bénabou and Tirole 
(2010), Schreck (2011), Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012), Crifo and Forget (2015), and Kim et al. (2019). 
4 According to KPMG (2015, 2017), CSR activities are indeed a dominant global business practice of the firms, 
but only 64% of the companies surveyed in 45 countries issued CSR reports, 73% of the top 100 companies 
reported their CSR activities, and 92% of the world’s 250 largest companies (in the 250 Global Fortune Index) 
performed CSR actions. It shows that global firms are more actively participating in CSR than other domestic 
firms. Further, more than 60% of the firms in all industry sectors now report on CSR all over the world, with 
80% in the American region, 78% in the Asia Pacific region, 77% in Europe, and 52 % in Africa. CASS (2017) 
also reports that an annual average of 71.4% of Chinese listed companies produce CSR reports. This implies 
that the widely observed phenomenon of different industries and countries where firms’ CSR activities are more 
or less, commonly widespread in the real world. 
5 Many researchers have investigated various aspects of CSR issues, involving horizontal competition (Kopel 
and Brand, 2012; Matsumura and Ogawa, 2014; Liu et al., 2015; Leal et al., 2018), vertical relations (Goering, 
2012, 2014; Brand and Grothe, 2013, 2015; Garcia et al., 2018), environmental CSR (Liu et al., 2015; Hirose 
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Then, a CSR-related incentive combines both profitability and consumer surplus. The basic idea is 
that even pure profit-maximizing firms engage in CSR because it may serve as a commitment device 
for their strategy choices in oligopolistic environments. 
Despite the global trend of CSR in internationalization and liberalization, state-owned firms are 
still highly concentrated in a few strategic sectors such as transportation, telecommunications, power 
generation, electricity, finance, and energy-related industries, and control large portions of global 
resources.6 In fact, many developed and developing countries have continued to privatize their state-
owned firms since the 1980s. Thus, privatization in these industries has attracted extensive policy 
attention from economics researchers in developed, developing, and transitional economies, such as 
Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia, including China.  
In fact, the recent decade has witnessed increasing application of international mixed oligopoly 
frameworks where public and private firms compete in the market. Many researchers have found 
them an extremely useful instrument for analyzing policy interactions between governments and firms 
in international markets. For example, Fjell and Pal (1996) proposed an economic model of a mixed 
oligopoly with foreign competitors and investigated the effect of the introduction of foreign private 
firms on market price and production allocation. Since then, many researchers have investigated the 
welfare effect of privatization policy in an international mixed market.7 In particular, recent research 
has analyzed different forms of market competition in which profit-maximizing private firms may 
compete with other private firms that have adopted CSR activities.8 However, these works took the 
level of CSR as an exogenous, given variable that was a normative goal established in the social 
contract. Further, previous research on mixed markets has focused on the strategic relations between 
privatization and CSR without considering the global firm in international markets.  
In this study, we address strategic motivations for CSR emerging from interactions between 
global and domestic firms in the context of a mixed market where public and private firms coexist in 
each country. The development of the global firm in the world market requires reconsideration of the 
decisions on privatization and CSR in light of international competition where the domestic 
                                                          
et al., 2017, 2020; Lee and Park, 2019; Fukuda and Ouchida, 2020), and international tariffs (Wang et al., 2012; 
Chang et al., 2014; Chao et al., 2006; Manasakis et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2018; Xu and Lee, 2019). 
6 According to an OECD report by Kowalski et al. (2013), among the 2000 largest public companies in the 
world, more than 10% are either SOEs or have significant government ownership; these government-associated 
companies’ sales are equivalent to approximately 6% of the global GDP. For some evidences in China, see Xu 
et al. (2020) 
7 Pal and White (1998, 2003), Yu and Lee (2011), Lee et al. (2013), Xu and Lee (2015) and Cato and Matsumura 
(2015) discussed the relationship between privatization and trade policies, while Lin and Matsumura (2012), 
Cato and Matsumura (2012), and Xu et al. (2017) considered foreign penetration of private firm’s ownership. 
8 For example, recent theoretical studies have examined the effect of CSR on tariffs and welfare in international 
trade, such as Wang et al. (2012), Chang et al. (2014), Manasakis et al. (2018), Liu et al. (2018), Wang et al. 
(2018), Cho et al. (2019) and Xu and Lee (2019). 
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ownership share of the global firm is important, which might differ among the countries.9 In the 
presence of different ownership share of the global firm, the examination of the effect of privatization 
on the CSR decision of a global firm with multiple plants in international markets is a worthwhile 
endeavor. Our contribution to the theoretical research is to develop a framework that incorporates a 
wider range of global firms’ strategic activities in international mixed market. To determine the extent 
to which privatization policy affects CSR, we examine whether a global firm strategically changes 
the degree of its CSR, depending on privatization policy of each country and the ownership share of 
the domestic investors, and investigate the effect of CSR on the domestic and global welfares in 
different countries. Our study adds to the literature by examining whether a global firm’s strategic 
adoption of CSR is an additional potential source of gain from global engagement.10   
We specifically consider triopoly markets in two countries, in which a domestic public firm 
competes with a domestic private firm as well as a global firm in each country where the global firm 
may choose the transmission of CSR behavior in both countries.11  Extending analytic framework of 
Kim, et al. (2019), we will consider a global firm participating in CSR activities in both countries and 
focus on the analysis of the effect of privatization policy on the strategic CSR of the global firm by 
eliminating the trade effect between the countries. We examine four different regimes of privatization 
policies of each government, that is, (i) dual privatization of public firms in each country (i.e., dual 
private markets), (ii) dual nationalization of public firms in each country (i.e., dual mixed markets), 
and (iii) single privatization of one of the public firms in each country (i.e., two asymmetric private 
and mixed markets). We also compare the equilibrium outcomes of each model and analyze how the 
privatization policy and the percentage of the global firm’s shares held in each country affect the 
strategic CSR and the domestic and global welfares. 
The following are main findings. First, we show that the effects of privatization on the degree of 
CSR and welfares depend on the percentage of the global firm’s shares held in each country. On one 
                                                          
9 For example, government restriction on the foreign ownership among the countries in the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) differ. Thailand government does not permit more than 50% foreign 
ownership, whereas 100% foreign ownership is allowed in Vietnam. For more descriptions on the investment 
laws of ASEAN countries are provided in https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/investment-laws-
asean-countries.pdf 
10 As related works based on the bilateral mixed oligopoly framework in an international competition, Lee et al 
(2013) and Xu and Lee (2019) examine policy competitions between tariffs and privatization while Xu and Lee 
(2015) analyzes strategic relationship between environmental tax and tariffs under different privatization 
policies between the two countries. Further, Xu et al. (2016) incorporates the excess burden of taxation of 
subsidy/tariff under privatization policies. 
11 Plenty of works assumed an asymmetric market organization where CSR adoption can be endogenously 
chosen, but only some firms adopt CSR among all firms. For example, Lambertini and Pampieri (2015) and 
Leal et al. (2018) showed that CSR might increase the profits of the CSR-initiated firm than non-CSR firms in 
the homogeneous product market. 
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hand, dual privatization policy increases the strategic CSR of the global firm, which could substitute 
the output-reducing effect of the dual privatization policy. However, dual privatization policy reduces 
(improves) domestic welfare when the percentage of shares held in this country is low (high), but it 
always improves global welfare.  
On the other hand, when the percentage of the global firm’s shares held in one country is small 
(large), single privatization in this county increases (decreases) the degree of CSR and global welfare, 
but reduces (improves) domestic (foreign) welfare. Further, single privatization policy in one country 
leads to the highest domestic welfare in the rival country.  
Second, we examine the global standard of CSR, which is set cooperatively to maximize global 
welfare, and show that the effects of privatization on the global standards also depend on the 
percentage of the global firm’s shares held in each country, while the global CSR is always higher 
than the strategic CSR. Moreover, domestic welfare under global CSR is higher (lower) than that 
under the strategic CSR when the percentage of shares held in this country is small (large). Further, 
the global CSR always leads to a higher global welfare. Analyzing global welfare levels, we find that 
dual privatization policy leads to the highest global welfare when the global firm is equally owned by 
two countries, while single privatization policy in one country leads to the highest global welfare 
when the global firm is almost owned by this country. 
Finally, we investigate an international privatization choice game between two governments and 
show that irrespective of imposing the global standard of CSR, dual nationalization is a unique Nash 
equilibrium of the game, which yields the lowest level of CSR and social welfare when the percentage 
of shares held is intermediate. Therefore, two countries get a global welfare loss in a prisoner’s 
dilemma situation in which both countries choose a nationalization policy even though privatization 
policy is globally optimal. Therefore, an appropriate global cooperation on international privatization 
policies is necessary in international markets with a global firm which may adopt CSR. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model. In 
Section 3, we consider four different models and analyze equilibrium outcomes. In Section 4, we 
compare the results of strategic CSR, domestic welfare, and global welfare in the four models. We 
also examine the global CSR standard and compare the outcomes with those under strategic CSR. In 
Section 5, we consider an international privatization choice game between two countries. Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
2. THE MODEL 
Suppose that there are two countries, i and j, where three different firms in each country coexist: a 
state-owned public firm, a private firm, and a global firm. The global firm is defined as a profit-
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oriented private firm with a concern for two countries’ consumer surplus as a CSR initiative.12 We 
assume that the public and private firms supply products only in the domestic market, but the global 
firm can supply in both markets. We also assume that 𝛽𝛽 percent of the ownership share of the global 
firm is held in country i and (1 − 𝛽𝛽) percent in country j. We assume that 𝛽𝛽 ∈ (0,1), which is 
exogenously given and might differ between the countries.13 
All firms produce homogeneous products and the consumption of products in country i is 
denoted as 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑖𝑖 + 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖, where 𝑞𝑞si, 𝑞𝑞hi, and 𝑞𝑞ci denote the quantities supplied by a public 
firm, a private firm, and a global firm in country i, respectively, where 𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗. The inverse demand in 
both markets is symmetric and is given as: 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 1− 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖, where 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 is the market price in country i. 
Each firm’s cost function is the same and is assumed to be quadratic, as assumed in mixed oligopoly 
literature. Then, the profits of the three firms are: 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 − 12 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖2, 𝜋𝜋ℎ𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑖𝑖 − 12 𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑖𝑖2 and 𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐 = (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞ci − 12 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖2) + (𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑞𝑞cj − 12 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗2).                                                                                  (1) 
Note that the profit of the global firm in the two countries is 𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐 = 𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗 where 𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐 in 
country i, and 𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗 = (1− 𝛽𝛽)𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐 in country j. Note also that the global firm has a CSR initiative, which 
takes care of consumer surplus in both markets. Following Xu and Lee (2019), the objective function 
of the global firm is assumed as follows: 𝐺𝐺 = 𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐 + 𝛼𝛼(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗),                                                                                                            (2) 
where 𝛼𝛼 ∈ [0,1]  represents the degree of a global firm’s CSR and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 12𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖2  is the consumer 
surplus in country i, where 𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗 . That is, a CSR initiative implies that the private firm adopts 
consumer surplus as a proxy for its own CSR concerns. Note that the CSR incentive combines both 
profitability and consumer surplus in a convex combination formula. When a global firm engaged in 
CSR places a weight on consumer surplus in its objective function, it is analogous with assuming that 
the firm places a higher weight on output and is thus aggressive in production. Here, 𝛼𝛼 = 0 indicates 
a pure profit-maximizing private firm. Finally, we assume that the global firm strategically chooses 
its degree of CSR to maximize its profits in Eq. (1). It is worth noting that we adopt a strategic 
                                                          
12 Many studies formulated the CSR-initiative by utilizing a theoretical model where the firm adopts consumer 
surplus as a proxy of its own CSR concerns. For example, see Kopel and Brand (2012), Brand and Grothe 
(2013), Matsumura and Ogawa (2014), Lambertini and Tampiere (2015), Kopel (2015), Leal et al. (2018), 
Garcia et al. (2018), and Xu and Lee (2019) among others. 
13 For instance, 𝛽𝛽 is different between the two countries in the ASEAN countries. 
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perspective of CSR, which can be used to increase profitability.14 
We define domestic welfare as the sum of consumer surplus and domestic industry profits in 
each country: 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋ℎ𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 and     𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 + 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 + 𝜋𝜋ℎ𝑗𝑗 + 𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗.                                                                                                    (3) 
The global welfare is the sum of the two domestic welfares:  𝑊𝑊_ =𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 +𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗.                                                                                                                            (4) 
The objective function of the public firm depends on whether it is privatized or not: the public firm 
is assumed to maximize domestic welfare in Eq. (3), while the fully privatized firm is assumed to 
maximize its own profits in Eq. (1).15 
A three-stage game is constructed. In the first stage, the government decides whether to privatize 
its public firm. In the second stage, the global firm chooses the degree of CSR. In the third stage, 
upon observing the global firm’s degree of CSR in a mixed or private market, the three firms compete 
in quantities in a Cournot fashion. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is solved by backward 
induction. 
3. THE ANALYSIS  
In this section, we consider four different models: mixed markets in both countries, private markets 
in both countries, and two asymmetric private and mixed markets. In the dual mixed markets, both 
governments symmetrically choose to keep their public ownership, and thus, a public firm competes 
with both a domestic private firm and a global firm in a mixed oligopoly in both countries. In the dual 
private markets, both governments symmetrically choose to privatize their public firms, and thus, two 
domestic private firms compete with the global firm in a private oligopoly in both countries. However, 
in the asymmetric markets, one government keeps its public firm while the other government chooses 
to privatize.  
                                                          
14 Kim et al. (2019) reviewed the recent perspective of CSR in the economics literature. In particular, a firm 
that engages in CSR can earn higher profits in a managerial delegation model where it uses an instrumental 
CSR to increase its profitability. See, for example, Kopel and Brand (2012), Lambertini and Tampiere (2015), 
Kopel (2015), Garcial et al. (2018), and Lee and Park (2019). 
15 The privatized firm is assumed to be a pure profit-maximizing firm compared with the global firm with CSR-
initiative. This implies that firms behave differently in response to the government policies because of different 
corporate cultures, values, structures, and strategies. See Post et al. (2002) and Liu et al. (2018). 
8 
 
3.1 Dual mixed markets 
In the third stage, the public firm in each market maximizes its domestic welfare. Then, the 
differentiation of Eq. (3) with respect to 𝑞𝑞si and 𝑞𝑞sj, respectively, yield:   
𝜕𝜕𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 1 − 𝛽𝛽𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 − 𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑖𝑖 − 2𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 = 1− (1− 𝛽𝛽)𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗 − 𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑗𝑗 − 2𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 = 0.                                                                                  (5) 
For the private firm in each market, the differentiation of Eq. (1) with respect to 𝑞𝑞hi  and 𝑞𝑞hj , 
respectively, yield:   
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋ℎ𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑖𝑖 = 1− 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 − 3𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑖𝑖 − 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋ℎ𝑗𝑗𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑗𝑗 = 1− 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗 − 3𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑗𝑗 − 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 = 0.                                                                                               (6) 
For the global firm in both markets, the differentiation of Eq. (2) with respect to 𝑞𝑞ei  and 𝑞𝑞ej , 
respectively, yield:  
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 = 1− 3𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 − 𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑖𝑖 − 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼(𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑖𝑖 + 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖) = 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗 = 1− 3𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗 − 𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑗𝑗 − 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼(𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗 + 𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑗𝑗 + 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) = 0.                                                            (7) 
By solving Eqs. (5)-(7), we derive the equilibrium outputs of the three firms in the third stage as 
𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 6−𝛼𝛼−2𝛽𝛽−𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽2𝐻𝐻1 , 𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑖𝑖 = 2−2𝛼𝛼+𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽2𝐻𝐻1 , 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 = 2+3𝛼𝛼2𝐻𝐻1  and 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 = 4−2𝛼𝛼+2𝛽𝛽+𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽2𝐻𝐻2 ,𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑗𝑗 = 2−𝛼𝛼−𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽2𝐻𝐻2 , 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗 = 2+3𝛼𝛼2𝐻𝐻2 ,                                                                           (8) 
where 𝐻𝐻1 = 7− 2𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽 + 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽 and 𝐻𝐻2 = 6− 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 − 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽. Note that (i) 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼 ><0 when 𝛽𝛽 <> 13 and 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼 <>0 
when 𝛽𝛽 <> 23; (ii) 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼 < 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑗𝑗𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼 < 0; (iii) 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼 > 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼 > 0. First, the effect of 𝛼𝛼 on the output of 
the public firm depends on 𝛽𝛽. The output of the public firm in country i is increasing in 𝛼𝛼 when 𝛽𝛽 is 
small, whereas it is decreasing in 𝛼𝛼  when 𝛽𝛽  is large. In other words, when a relatively smaller 
percentage of shares in the global firm is held in country i, that is 0 < 𝛽𝛽 < 13, the domestic public firm 
will produce more products when the global firm pays more attention to CSR. Thus, the public and 
global firm’s products are strategic complements when 𝛽𝛽  is low. Second, the effect of 𝛼𝛼  on the 
outputs of the private and global firms are independent of 𝛽𝛽. In particular, the private firm’s output 
decreases in 𝛼𝛼, whereas the global firm’s output increases in 𝛼𝛼. In other words, when the global firm 
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pays more attention to CSR, it chooses to produce more, whereas the domestic private firm will 
produce less. Thus, products are strategic substitutes among these two private firms. 
The global firm’s resulting profit is 
𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐 = (2+3𝛼𝛼)�6�85−2𝛽𝛽+2𝛽𝛽2�−𝛼𝛼�979+62𝛽𝛽−62𝛽𝛽2�+𝛼𝛼2�358+80𝛽𝛽−80𝛽𝛽2�−𝛼𝛼3�39+6𝛽𝛽−6𝛽𝛽2��8𝐻𝐻12𝐻𝐻22 .                    (9) 
The resulting global welfare is  
𝑊𝑊_ = 14𝐻𝐻12𝐻𝐻22 �4(1249 + 74𝛽𝛽 − 74𝛽𝛽2)− 2𝛼𝛼(2078 + 169𝛽𝛽 − 163𝛽𝛽2 − 12𝛽𝛽3 + 6𝛽𝛽4) + 𝛼𝛼2(449 +
507𝛽𝛽 − 485𝛽𝛽2 − 44𝛽𝛽3 + 22𝛽𝛽4) + 2𝛼𝛼3(98 − 67𝛽𝛽 + 63𝛽𝛽2 + 8𝛽𝛽3 − 4𝛽𝛽4)− 𝛼𝛼4(35 − 19𝛽𝛽 + 21𝛽𝛽2 − 4𝛽𝛽3 +
2𝛽𝛽4)�.                                                                                                                                                      (10) 
In the second stage, the global firm chooses its degree of CSR to maximize its own profit in Eq. (9). 
Thus, the differentiation of Eq. (9) with respect to 𝛼𝛼 yields 
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼 = 14𝐻𝐻13𝐻𝐻23 �2(5196− 995𝛽𝛽 + 931𝛽𝛽2 + 128𝛽𝛽3 − 64𝛽𝛽4)− 𝛼𝛼(101428 + 7205𝛽𝛽 −
7067𝛽𝛽2 − 276𝛽𝛽3 + 138𝛽𝛽4) + 6𝛼𝛼2(10672 + 2830𝛽𝛽 − 2733𝛽𝛽2 − 194𝛽𝛽3 + 97𝛽𝛽4)−𝛼𝛼3(14848 + 2635𝛽𝛽 − 2397𝛽𝛽2 − 476𝛽𝛽3 + 238𝛽𝛽4) + 3𝛼𝛼4(409− 50𝛽𝛽 + 24𝛽𝛽2 + 52𝛽𝛽3 −
26𝛽𝛽4)� = 0.                                      (11) 
Solving Eq. (11), we can find the strategic CSR at equilibrium, but it is too long to write. Thus, we 
will show the equilibrium results in graphic form in Fig. 1.16. We can show that the relationship 
between strategic CSR and 𝛽𝛽 is a U shape. In particular, strategic CSR is minimized when 𝛽𝛽 = 12, 
whereas it is maximized when 𝛽𝛽 = 0 and 𝛽𝛽 = 1. In other word, the degree of CSR is decreasing in 𝛽𝛽 
when the share hold in country i is less than a half, while it is increasing in 𝛽𝛽 when the share hold in 
country i is more than a half. In particular, we have 𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 0.103 when 𝛽𝛽 = 12, and 𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 0.110 
when 𝛽𝛽 = 0 and 𝛽𝛽 = 1 , where subscript “MM” denotes the equilibrium in the dual mixed markets. 
Thus, we have 𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ∈ [0.103, 0.110]. 
Note that domestic welfare is increasing in 𝛽𝛽 in country i and 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ∈ [0.318, 0.395]. That is, 
when the larger percentage of shares in the global firm are held in the country it will be better off, 
whereas it will be worse off when the larger percentage of shares is held in the rival country. 
Moreover, we also show that the relationship between the global welfare and 𝛽𝛽 is an inversed U shape 
and the global welfare is maximized when 𝛽𝛽 = 12. In other words, form the view of global welfare, it 
                                                          
16 Fig. 2and Fig. 3 also represents the equilibrium domestic and global welfares of the following four cases. 
10 
 
is socially desirable when equal shares are held in both countries. Finally, we have 𝑊𝑊_ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ∈ [0.712,
0.715]. 
3.2 Dual private markets 
In the third stage, the fully privatized public firm in each market maximizes its profit in Eq. (1), and 
thus, the differentiation of Eq. (1) with respect to 𝑞𝑞si and 𝑞𝑞sj yield 
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 1− 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 − 𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑖𝑖 − 3𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 = 1− 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗 − 𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑗𝑗 − 3𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 = 0.                                   (12) 
Solving Eqs. (6), (7) and (12), the equilibrium outputs of three firms are derived as 
𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 = 𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑖𝑖 = 𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑗𝑗 = 2−𝛼𝛼2(5−𝛼𝛼) and 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 = 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗 = 1+𝛼𝛼5−𝛼𝛼.                                                                   (13) 
Note that 
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼 = 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼 = 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼 = 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞ℎ𝑗𝑗𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼 < 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼 = 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼 > 0. That is, the output of the private firm is 
decreasing in 𝛼𝛼, whereas the output of the global firm is increasing in 𝛼𝛼. Products are also strategic 
substitutes among the private and global firms. 
The profit of the global firm is  
𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐 = 3(1−𝛼𝛼2)(5−𝛼𝛼)2 .                                                                                                                            (14) 
The resulting global welfare is  
𝑊𝑊_ = 3(2−𝛼𝛼)(6+𝛼𝛼)2(5−𝛼𝛼)2 .                                                                                                                     (15) 
In the second stage, the global firm chooses its degree of CSR to maximize its own profit in Eq. (14). 
Thus, the differentiation of Eq. (14) with respect to 𝛼𝛼 yields 
𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 15,                                                                                                                                   (16) 
where subscript “PP” denotes the equilibrium in the dual private markets. Note that the strategic CSR 
is independent of 𝛽𝛽. In the dual private markets, the profit of the global firm is independent of 𝛽𝛽, thus, 
the percentage of shares held in each country does not affect the degree of CSR.  
The domestic welfare and social welfare are  
 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 77256+ 𝛽𝛽8, 𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 109256− 𝛽𝛽8 and 𝑊𝑊_ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 93128 = 0.726.                                                      (17) 
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Note that domestic welfare in country i (j) is increasing (decreasing) in  , and 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 ∈ [0.301, 0.426]. 
Moreover, the global welfare is independent of 𝛽𝛽in the dual private markets. 
Below, we compare the results in the dual mixed markets with those in the dual private markets, 
and examine the effect of privatization policy by both countries. 
Lemma 1: Dual privatization policy increases the global firm’s strategic CSR. 
The output of the global firm is increasing in 𝛼𝛼  and products among the private firms are 
strategic substitutes. Thus, when both governments choose to privatize their public firms, the global 
firm pays more attention to CSR, which can reduce this output-reducing effect of privatization policy, 
but increases the profit of the global firm from the increasing degree of CSR. Thus, the dual 
privatization policy and strategic CSR are complements. 
Lemma 2: Dual privatization policy reduces (improves) domestic welfare when 𝛽𝛽 is low (high) in its 
domestic market, but it always improves global welfare. 
When both governments privatize their public firms simultaneously, one government could be 
better off ex-post privatization only when it has a larger percentage of the share in the global firm. 
Moreover, from the viewpoint of global welfare, the dual privatization policy is always better for both 
countries.  
3.3 Private-mixed markets 
We now consider an asymmetric case with the private-mixed markets in which only the government 
in country i chooses to privatize its public firm, while the government in country j chooses not to in 
the first stage. Thus, the global firm competes in a private (mixed) market in country i (j). 
In the third stage, the equilibrium outputs of the three firms in country i and j are the same as 
those in Eqs. (13) and (8). Then, the resulting profit of the global firm is  
𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐 = 12(61+12𝛽𝛽+𝛽𝛽2)−4𝛼𝛼(41+92𝛽𝛽+6𝛽𝛽2)−𝛼𝛼2(973+340𝛽𝛽)+2𝛼𝛼3(179+140𝛽𝛽+12𝛽𝛽2)−3𝛼𝛼4(11+12𝛽𝛽+4𝛽𝛽2)8(5−𝛼𝛼)2𝐻𝐻22 .  (18) 
The resulting global welfare is 𝑊𝑊_ = 4(649+208𝛽𝛽+9𝛽𝛽2)−2𝛼𝛼(842+629𝛽𝛽+117𝛽𝛽2)+𝛼𝛼2(69+425𝛽𝛽+92𝛽𝛽2)+2𝛼𝛼3(41−5𝛽𝛽−𝛽𝛽2)−𝛼𝛼4(10+5𝛽𝛽+4𝛽𝛽2)4(5−𝛼𝛼)2𝐻𝐻22 .                  (19) 
In the second stage, the global firm maximizes its profit in Eq. (18) and chooses its degree of CSR: 
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼 = 3(1−5𝛼𝛼)(5−𝛼𝛼)3 − 5(3+𝛼𝛼)(2+3𝛼𝛼)24(1−𝛼𝛼)2𝐻𝐻23 + (2+3𝛼𝛼)(19+21𝛼𝛼)4(1−𝛼𝛼)2𝐻𝐻22 − 1+4𝛼𝛼(1−𝛼𝛼)2𝐻𝐻2 = 0.                                               (20) 
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Note that the strategic CSR is decreasing in 𝛽𝛽 and 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀(𝛽𝛽 = 0) = 0.197 while 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀(𝛽𝛽 = 1) = 0.106. 
Thus, we have 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀 ∈ [0.106, 0.197], where subscript “PM” denotes the equilibrium in the private-
mixed markets. Note that the domestic welfare in country i (j) is also increasing (decreasing) in 𝛽𝛽. 
Then, we have 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀 ∈ [0.301, 0.393]. The global welfare is decreasing in 𝛽𝛽 in the private-mixed 
markets. That is, the global welfare is maximized when one country chooses an earlier privatization 
and the rival country holds all shares of the global firm. Then, we have 𝑊𝑊_ 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀 ∈ [0.710, 0.730].  
Below, we compare the results in the dual mixed markets and those in the private-mixed markets, 
and examine the effect of privatization policy by both countries. The following lemma shows the 
effect of the ex-post privatization in county i on the degree of the strategic CSR and welfares.  
Lemma 3: Single privatization in county i increases (decreases) the degree of CSR when 𝛽𝛽 is low 
(high). 
When the government in country i chooses to privatize its public firm, the global firm mostly 
pays more attention to CSR, which can reduce the output-reducing effect of privatization policy. 
However, if the shares of this global firm are all held in the rival country j, the ex-post privatization 
in country i could lead to a decrease in the strategic CSR of the global firm.  
Lemma 4: Single privatization in county i reduces (improves) domestic (foreign) welfare whereas it 
improves (reduces) global welfare when 𝛽𝛽 is low (high). 
This implies that the domestic government which privatizes its public firm could be worse off 
because of this earlier privatization, while the foreign government will be better off. However, the 
effect on the global welfare depends on the relative share in the global firm. In particular, when the 
shares in the global firm are all held in the rival country j, the single privatization in country i reduces 
the global welfare. 
3.4 Mixed-private markets 
As a reversed case, we can also consider an asymmetric case with mixed and private markets in which 
the government in country i decides to privatize its public firm while the government in country j 
decides not to privatize in the first stage. Then, the global firm competes in a private (mixed) market 
in country i (j). In this case, however, if we change i to j and 𝛽𝛽 to 1 − 𝛽𝛽, the results are the same as 
those in the previous model with private and mixed markets in each country. Therefore, we exclude 
the detailed analysis. We use the subscript “MP” to denote the equilibrium in the mixed-private 
markets.  
4. DISCUSSION ON THE CSR INITIATIVE 
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4.1 Comparisons of strategic CSR 
Proposition 1: Dual privatization policy always leads to the highest degree of the strategic CSR, 
whereas dual nationalization (single privatization) policy leads to the lowest degree of the strategic 
CSR when 𝛽𝛽 is (not) intermediate.  
<FIGURE 1> 
Fig. 1 shows the comparison of the strategic CSR of the four models. First, when the two 
governments simultaneously choose to privatize their public firms, the global firm will be more 
aggressive and thus always choose the highest degree of CSR, which could reduce the output-reducing 
effect of the dual privatization policy. Second, when the two governments simultaneously choose not 
to privatize their public firms, the global firm will be less aggressive and thus chooses the lowest 
degree of CSR when its shares are almost same in both countries, that is, 𝛽𝛽 is intermediate. Otherwise, 
single privatization leads to the lowest degree of CSR when the shares in the global firm are almost 
fully held in the opposite country. 
Proposition 2: Single privatization policy leads to the lowest (highest) domestic welfare in its own 
(rival) country.  
<FIGURE 2> and <FIGURE 3> 
Fig. 2 shows the comparison of the domestic welfare of the four models while Fig. 3 shows the 
comparison of the global welfare of the four models. It shows that when the public firm competes 
with both the domestic private firm and the global firm, the local government will benefit the most 
from the later privatization policy decision, whereas it will lose the most from an early decision. 
Hence, both governments will hesitate to choose privatization before the other country. We will 
discuss this result in an international privatization choice game in next section. 
4.2 Comparisons with global CSR standards 
Below, we can imagine the case that both countries can cooperatively set the global CSR standard 
which can maximize global welfare and impose to the global firm to meet this global CSR standard 
under the global guideline, for example, proposed by the OECD.17 Then, the global CSR standard can 
                                                          
17  It is becoming more common that global policy standards for international CSR are suggested for 
multinational global firms. The European Commission promotes CSR in the EU and encourages firms to adhere 
to international guidelines and principles. The ISO 26000 guidance on social responsibility was published in 
2010, and the updated OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises and the UN guiding principles on business 
and human rights were released in 2011. Furthermore, the Global Reporting Initiative (GNI) provides a globally 
applicable framework for drawing up sustainability reports in accordance with internationally recognized 
criteria (see Aaronson, 2007; Vidal-Leon, 2013). 
14 
 
lead to a higher global welfare, compared to strategic CSR by a global firm. We can consider four 
different models and examine the global CSR standard in each case, respectively. 
First, we consider the global CSR standard in the dual mixed markets. Then, the differentiation 
of Eq. (10) with respect to 𝛼𝛼, i.e., 𝜕𝜕𝑊𝑊_𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼 = 0, yields the global CSR standard.18 Note that the relationship 
between the global CSR standard and β is inverted-U shaped. That is, the global CSR standard 
increases first and then decreases with β, and it is higher than the strategic CSR. The global standard 
is maximized when β = 12, while it is minimized when 𝛽𝛽 = 0,1. Then, we have 𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀∗(𝛽𝛽 = 0,1) =
0.278 and 𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀∗(𝛽𝛽 = 12) = 0.215. Thus, we have 𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀∗ ∈ [0.712, 0.715]. 
Lemma 5: In the dual mixed markets, (ii) the domestic welfare under global CSR standard is higher 
(lower) than that under strategic CSR when 𝛽𝛽 is low (high) in country i; 
<FIGURE 4> 
Second, we consider the global CSR standard in the dual private markets. Then, the 
differentiation of Eq. (15) with respect to α yields αPP∗ = 27 = 0.286. Thus, the global CSR standard 
is independent of β, and it is higher than the strategic CSR. Comparing the results, we obtain: 
(i) αPP∗ = 27 > αPP = 15 ; (ii) WiPP∗ −WiPP = 27−32𝛽𝛽30976 >< 0  when 𝛽𝛽 <> 0.844 ;(iii) 𝑊𝑊_ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃∗ = 88121 >𝑊𝑊_ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 93128 . 
Thus, we have the following lemma. 
Lemma 6: In the dual private markets, the domestic welfare under global CSR is higher (lower) than 
that under strategic CSR when 𝛽𝛽 is low (high) in country i; 
<FIGURE 5> 
Finally, we consider the global CSR standard under an asymmetric case in the private and mixed 
markets. Thus, the differentiation of Eq. (19), i.e., 
𝜕𝜕𝑊𝑊_𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼 = 0, yields the global CSR standard. Note that 
the global CSR standard is decreasing in 𝛽𝛽 . That is, 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀∗(𝛽𝛽 = 0) = 0.312 and 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀∗(𝛽𝛽 = 1) =
0.184. Thus, we have 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀∗ ∈ [0.184, 0.312]. 
Lemma 7: In the private-mixed markets, the domestic welfare under global CSR is higher (lower) 
than that under strategic CSR when 𝛽𝛽 is low (high) in country i; 
<FIGURE 6> 
                                                          
18
 We show the equilibrium CSR and welfares and the comparison with those under strategic CSR in MM case 
in Fig. 4. Accordingly, Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 represents the comparisons in PP case and PM case. 
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Proposition 3: Regardless of privatization policies between the two countries, the global CSR 
standard is higher than the strategic CSR, and it always leads to a higher global welfare  
This finding implies that rather than considering CSR on a voluntary basis, active global 
guidelines are necessary for promoting it. Furthermore, the effect of the global CSR standard on 
domestic welfare depends on 𝛽𝛽, whereas it leads to a higher (lower) domestic welfare when 𝛽𝛽 is low 
(high) in country i. Hence, the global CSR guideline is more effective for domestic welfare when the 
share percentage of the global firm’s shares held is relatively small. 
5. INTERNATIONAL PRIVATIZATION CHOICE GAME 
In this section, we extend the analysis into an international privatization choice game in which each 
country chooses its privatization policy non-cooperatively and simultaneously to maximize its 
domestic welfare in the beginning of the game. Then, we can consider the following privatization 
choice game in Table 1. 
TABLE I PRIVATIZATION CHOICE GAME 
 
 
Proposition 4: In the privatization choice game, the unique Nash equilibrium is (𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ,𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀). 
Proof: Comparing the domestic welfare in country i and j ， we can obtain that 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃 >𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ><𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 >𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀 and 𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀 >𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 ><𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 >𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃 when 𝛽𝛽 <>0.383. 
This implies that the equilibrium of the international privatization choice game is dual 
nationalization policy, which is consistent with the result in Xu et al. (2016) and Xu and Lee (2019).19  
Our analysis also indicate that the equilibrium yields the lowest CSR level and domestic welfare when 𝛽𝛽 is intermediate. However, dual privatization policy yields the highest CSR level and domestic 
welfare when 𝛽𝛽 is intermediate.  
We now compare the global welfare in the equilibrium. From Fig. 3, we can find that dual 
privatization policy leads to the highest global welfare when 𝛽𝛽  is intermediate, while single 
privatization policy leads to the highest global welfare when 𝛽𝛽 is relatively low or quite high. Thus, 
                                                          
19  Xu et al. (2016) and Xu and Lee (2019) considered an excess burden of taxation and the impact of CSR on 
policy interaction between tariffs and privatization, respectively, and showed that both countries choose dual 
nationalization policy in the Nash equilibrium in an international privatization choice game. 
Country i, j Nationalization Privatization 
Nationalization (𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀,𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀) (𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃 ,𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃) 
Privatization (𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀 ,𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀) (𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 ,𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃) 
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the equilibrium of the international privatization choice game never achieves the highest global 
welfare. This finding suggests a prisoner’s dilemma in the international privatization choice game, 
which yields the global welfare loss under strategic CSR by a global firm.20   
Finally, we can also examine the international privatization choice game under the global standard 
of CSR. Then, we can also show that the equilibrium of the international privatization choice game 
under global standard of CSR also never achieves the highest global welfare.21 
Proposition 5: In the international privatization choice game, irrespective of imposing global 
standard of CSR, the Nash equilibrium cannot yield the highest global welfare. 
This finding implies that an appropriate global cooperation on international privatization policies 
is necessary in international mixed markets with a global firm, which may adopt CSR. It is also 
noteworthy that it is globally optimal when the ownership share of the global firm is equal to both 
countries under the same demand and cost structures in the international competition. 
6. CONCLUSION  
We considered a global firm’s strategic CSR in international mixed markets and examined the 
relationship between the strategic level of CSR by the global firm and privatization policy in both 
countries. We showed that the equilibrium outcomes depend crucially on the percentage of the global 
firm’s shares held in each country. In particular, we showed that single privatization policy increases 
(decreases) the degree of CSR when the percentage of shares held is small (large), while dual 
privatization policy always leads to the highest degree of CSR. We also considered the global standard 
of CSR and showed that domestic welfare under the global standard of CSR is higher (lower) than 
that under strategic CSR when the percentage of shares held is small (large). Finally, we investigated 
an international privatization choice game between two governments and show that dual 
nationalization policy is a unique Nash equilibrium, even though privatization policy is globally 
optimal. Therefore, an appropriate global cooperation on international privatization policies is 
necessary in international mixed markets with a global firm, which may adopt CSR. 
The findings of our study provide important policy implications for both governments in 
designing non-cooperative privatization policies in an era where the CSR initiatives of global firms 
                                                          
20
 The results of prisoner’s dilemma game usually appear in the analysis of privatization choice game in the 
international mixed oligopolies. For example, Xu and Lee (2015, 2019) examined the interactions with tariffs 
or emission taxes in an international trade model in mixed markets and emphasized the cooperativeness in trade 
policies. 
21 From the Fig. 7 and Fig. 8, comparing the domestic welfare in country i and j under global standards, we can 
obtain that 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃∗ > 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀∗ ><𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃∗ >𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀∗ and 𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀∗ > 𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃∗ ><𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀∗ >𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃∗ when 𝛽𝛽 <> 0.425. Thus, the 
unique Nash equilibrium is (𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀∗,𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀∗). 
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have become a global issue for society. We propose that rather than allowing a global firm’s CSR on 
a voluntary basis, there should be active and cooperative global guidelines for promoting it. Therefore, 
an ambitious global regulatory framework that meets global standards is required for global firms to 
promote a higher degree of CSR in international trade.  
However, future research avenues remain. First, alternative scenarios such as a symmetric CSR 
situation in which the domestic firm also engages in CSR activates22, various competition modes with 
product differentiation, and more general specifications for the demand and cost functions between 
firms should be studied Second, we regarded CSR as a proxy of consumer surplus, whereas a recent 
approach examines strategic CSR under which firms use CSR activities as an instrument to reduce 
the social cost or create positive externalities.23 Finally, since we provided various possibilities in the 
theoretical examinations, many empirical predictions should be tested with dataset in the future work. 
Extending our analysis to different CSR activities would thus also be another direction for future 
research. 
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